Pricing of Complements in the U.S. freight railroads: Cournot versus Coase by Alexandrov, Alexei et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Pricing of Complements in the U.S.
freight railroads: Cournot versus Coase
Alexei Alexandrov and Russell Pittman and Olga Ukhaneva
Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice
18 April 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/86279/
MPRA Paper No. 86279, posted 20 April 2018 13:30 UTC
Pricing of Complements in the U.S. freight railroads: Cournot
versus Coase∗
Alexei Alexandrov† Russell Pittman‡ Olga Ukhaneva§
April 3, 2018
Abstract
Monopolists selling complementary products charge a higher price in a static equilibrium
than a single multiproduct monopolist would, reducing both the industry profits and consumer
surplus. However, firms could instead reach a Pareto improvement by lowering prices to the
single monopolist level. We analyze administrative nationally-representative pricing data of
railroad coal shipping in the U.S. We compare a coal producer that needs to ship from A to
C, with the route passing through B, in two cases: (1) the same railroad owning AB and BC
and (2) different railroads owning AB and BC. We do not find that price in case (2) is higher
than price in case (1), suggesting that the complementary monopolist pricing inefficiency is
absent in this market. For our main analysis, we use a specification consistent with the previous
literature; however, our findings are robust to propensity score blocking and machine learning
algorithms. Finally, we perform a difference-in-differences analysis to gauge the impact of a
merger that made two routes wholly-owned (switched from case 2 to case 1), and these results
are also consistent with our main findings. Our results have implications for vertical mergers,
tragedy of the anticommons, mergers of firms selling complements, and royalty stacking and
patent thickets.
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1 Introduction
One of the oldest issues in economics is the pricing of complements, with formal treatment dating
back to Augustin Cournot’s 1838 treatise (Cournot (1897)). One needs both copper and zinc to
make brass. Suppose that firm A is a monopolist selling copper and firm B is a monopolist selling
zinc to brass producers. Cournot showed that the sum of the prices of A and B is more than what
a monopolist selling the combination would charge. Prices are strategic substitutes, and each firm
has an incentive to raise its price higher than the single-monopolist level, since the other firm has
an incentive to lower its price in response, in a sense, to subsidize the other firm’s price increase.
In the resulting equilibrium, these complementary monopolists are worse for society than a single
monopoly: the prices are higher than a single monopolist charges, hurting both the consumers and
the firms themselves.1
However, there is a clear potential Pareto improvement: the firms could lower prices to the
single-monopolist level. Researchers, for example, Coase (1960), have postulated that, absent
transaction costs, agents with a potential Pareto improvement should be able to arrive at a Pareto
efficient outcome. In our setting, there could be several mechanisms of arriving to a Pareto im-
provement: Schumpeter (1928) suggests, effectively, a collusion between the two monopolists, while
Spulber (2017) shows that a Pareto optimal solution can be achieved through negotiations of mo-
nopolists with producers.
Thus, the question is an empirical one: do the firms act as static complementary monopolists
and arrive at a Pareto suboptimal outcome, as predicted by Cournot, or do they figure out a way
not to leave money on the table, as predicted by Coase and other researchers?2 We analyze this
question in the context of the U.S. freight railroads shipping coal. Controlling for the relevant route
characteristics, we do not find that the price of shipping through two firms is higher than the price
of shipping through one. Thus, we argue that in the case of the U.S. freight railroads shipping coal,
the Coasian prediction fits the data better. From the historical perspective, it is notable that in
1839 – a year after Cournot published his work in France – Charles Ellet, an American engineer,
published an analysis of railroad pricing in the United States, using similar calculus-based methods
and making many points similar to Cournot’s 1838 work, see Calsoyas (1950) for a review.
Aside from other applications, our results should be of interest for the railroad industry: coal,
together with intermodal freight, are the two largest rail commodities by revenue, with coal ac-
counting for about 17% of freight railroads’ revenue in 2015, see Association of American Railroads
(2016). Conversely, about 70% of coal is shipped via freight rail. Our results suggest that an
end-to-end railroad merger would not be needed to fix a Cournot or double-marginalization-like
pricing issue.3
1Sonnenschein (1968) formalized Cournot’s arguments and showed that Cournot duopoly is the dual of this
complementary monopoly.
2We refer to this possibility of Coasian prediction as a shorthand, without trying to disentangle whether the
underlying mechanism is closer to the one suggested by Schumpeter (1928) or the one suggested by Spulber (2017).
3Nonetheless, we do not analyze other, more traditional merger efficiencies, and thus do not address the question
of whether a vertical railroad merger could indeed result in lower prices to consumers for reasons of other efficiencies
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We describe other applications below, including royalty stacking in intellectual property, vertical
double marginalization (and mergers), and the tragedy of the anticommons. We also describe our
method and why we believe that the railroad data set presents a unique opportunity to study this
question.
While making brass is important, arguably the most contested recent application of this analysis
is in the area of intellectual property. Hundreds of different complementary patents might be needed
to make a modern device, for example a cell phone. The concepts of royalty stacking or patent
thickets (see Shapiro (2001) and Lemley and Shapiro (2006)), are effectively Cournot’s analysis
applied to intellectual property. The policy implications are clear: having many different patent
holders that are all needed to make a product would result in an inefficient outcome with individual
patent license rates (prices) that are too high. Other researchers, soon after, suggested that there are
mechanisms in the market that prevent this Pareto-inefficient outcome (see, for example, Geradin,
Layne-Farrar, and Padilla (2007), Elhauge (2008), and Sidak (2008)). Even more relevant to
our paper, see Spulber (2016) and Spulber (2017) for formal models of how bargaining between
complementary input monopolists and producers can lead to avoidance of the inefficient Cournot
outcome.
We discuss below some of the empirical research relating to patents and royalty stacking; how-
ever, the common thread is significant data limitations. In short, there is no representative database
where one could observe royalties that each manufacturer pays to each patent holder, as these
negotiations are highly confidential and situation-specific (see Hagiu and Yoffie (2013)). Even non-
representative databases are non-existent as far as we know.4 Thus, the existing empirical research
had to rely on secondary indicators, for example the size of the patent portfolio, the proclivity to
patent, and the firms’ market value.
In contrast, we use years of nationally-representative administrative data on pricing of railroad
freight, allowing a direct test of the theory. Consider a shipper that wants to transport goods from
A to C, a route that passes through B. We estimate whether the price paid from A to C is the
same when the same railroad owns both AB and BC tracks as it is when one railroad owns AB and
another owns BC. We estimate difference in prices by comparing otherwise similar routes, with the
difference being whether the route is wholly-owned. We control for available characteristics of the
route, including competitiveness of the railroads, and use a comparatively homogeneous product –
coal.
For identification, we believe that our treatment variable – whether a route is wholly-owned by
the same railroad – is nearly as good as random conditional on observables. The specific junctions –
points where railroads meet – are outcomes of factors that often date back to the mid 19th century
when railroads in the U.S. were expanding. Those factors determined which railroad had the
resources to extend its tracks further, and thus whether a particular route ended up wholly-owned.
While coal was, and continues to be, an important commodity for railroads, the locations where coal
such as economies of scope. For such analysis see Ivaldi and Mccullough (2010).
4A notable exception is some historical data on patent pools, for example, see Lampe and Moser (2010) and Lampe
and Moser (2013) analyzing 19th century patent pools for sewing machine patents.
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is mined have changed dramatically since the 19th century. In particular, while currently Wyoming
produces around half of the coal in the U.S., in the 19th century the leader was Pennsylvania, with
virtually no production in Wyoming. The current coal production in Pennsylvania is around one
tenth of that in Wyoming. A potential weak point in this position is that endogenous mergers since
that time have greatly changed the ownership patterns of once separate rail lines; however, we do
not believe that Cournot-like inefficiencies related to coal transportation were among the important
drivers of these mergers.
In addition to our main specification – a fixed effects pricing regression that was used in several
existing studies both by academics and by regulators – we use other methods to check whether
our results are robust. As one alternative, we use machine learning methods, as outlined by
Belloni and Chernozhukov (2013), Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2014), and Chernozhukov,
Chetverikov, Demirer, Duflo, Hansen, et al. (2016). The machine learning approach provides a way
to check the robustness of our results without relying on the exact functional specification used
in our main analysis. As another alternative, we construct propensity scores for the treatment,
split observations in smaller blocks based on propensity scores, run the same regression as in
the fixed effects specification within each block, and then analyze the weighted average of the
resulting coefficients. The method is described in Imbens and Rubin (2015), who recommend
this method over other propensity score techniques (for example, propensity score matching) or a
simple OLS regression. Both the machine learning analysis and regressions in the propensity score
blocks alleviate potential concerns over the exact functional form in the main analysis and variable
selection.
In addition to several methodological approaches producing the same answer, we also provide
an identification robustness check by using a difference-in-differences approach to analyze prices
following a merger that made two routes wholly-owned. To the extent that the premerger behavior
was Cournot, a merger should decrease the price for traffic carried over the newly wholly-owned
route. Also, given that this was a merger of two major railroads, but only two routes were affected,
it is doubtful that the merger was undertaken specifically to change prices on these two routes. We
also could not find any references to these routes in news stories around the time of the merger. Any,
even in our view implausible, concerns with the identification strategy above should be alleviated
by this analysis. While our estimate for this merger analysis is not as precise, our results are
consistent with the main specification.
This theoretical analysis had been applied in many other settings. Vertical double marginaliza-
tion – a monopolist manufacturer selling through a monopolist retailer – is one of the main examples,
e.g., Spengler (1950). Vertical mergers and mergers of firms producing complementary products are
generally viewed considerably more benign than horizontal (substitutes) mergers, in part because of
this very idea being that such a merger might alleviate the double marginalization/complementary
monopoly concern.5 Complementary monopolies have also received plenty of attention from the
5This branch of the literature is also related to foreclosure and tying. See, for example, Posner (1979), Moresi and
Salop (2013), and Tirole et al. (2015); see also Burton and Wilson (2006) on vertical exclusion in rail markets. For a
discussion of mergers of firms producing complements, see Anderson, Loertscher, and Schneider (2010).
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strategy literature, with a prominent example of Microsoft (Windows) and Intel in the 1990s and
2000s producing complementary inputs to a personal computer, see Casadesus-Masanell and Yoffie
(2007) and Casadesus-Masanell, Nalebuff, and Yoffie (2012).
Similar discussions of whether inefficiency survives market forces appear in other settings as
well. For example, in the vertical setting, a solution to this problem is well-known: a manufacturer
could offer a two-part tariff, see Oi (1971). At least some of the empirical literature seems to
agree that this is occurring in retail (Villas-Boas (2007)), although there are severe data limitations
in that stream of research as well, due to the manufacturers’ marginal cost not being directly
observed. For more recent empirical work, see Crawford, Lee, Whinston, and Yurukoglu (2015) for
multichannel television markets, Gayle (2013) for airline markets, and references therein.6
The same question appears in the literature on the tragedy of the anticommons, see, for example,
Heller (1998), Heller and Eisenberg (1998), and Buchanan and Yoon (2000), with some of the work
being specifically about patents. This literature also struggles with the Cournot-like issues of many
owners of, to use an analogy from property law, various sticks of property rights for the same
property, where someone needs to get everyone’s approval to get anything done. Similarly, the
literature also mentions the Coasian possibility of negotiating to an efficient outcome.
There are multiple empirical studies of patents that try to shed light on this issue, and on the
effect of patents on innovation in general, for example, see Murray and Stern (2007), Cockburn
and MacGarvie (2009), Gupta (2014), Cohen, Gurun, and Kominers (2015), Kiebzak, Rafert, and
Tucker (2016), and Hegde and Luo (2017).7 Between these studies, one can find estimates that
would support either conclusion. However, as noted above, none of the estimates that we are aware
of have pricing data to test the theory directly.
The intellectual property literature on royalty stacking influenced the ideas of fair and reasonable
non-discriminatory (FRAND) license terms and the discussion on patent assertion entities (PAEs,
also sometimes referred to as patent trolls) and patent pools. See Chiao, Lerner, and Tirole (2007),
Layne-Farrar, Padilla, and Schmalensee (2007), and Lemley (2007). Theoretical literature and
models continued to develop, again pointing to an empirical question of whether the resulting
equilibrium is closer to the work of Cournot or to the work of Coase, see for example, Llanes and
Trento (2012), Lemley and Shapiro (2013), Lerner and Tirole (2015), Rey and Salant (2012), and
Spulber (2013).
2 Data
Our data – the Waybill Sample – come from the U.S. Surface Transportation Board (STB), the
regulator of freight railroads in the U.S. There exists a version of the Sample for public use; however,
that version has much information aggregated or otherwise masked for competitive reasons. Since
6In particular, see Brueckner (2003) and Bamberger, Carlton, and Neumann (2004) showing that the effects in
the airline industry might be different than those that we are finding in the railroad industry.
7See also review articles, for example Boldrin and Levine (2013), Graham and Vishnubhakat (2013), and Khan
and Sokoloff (2001).
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this would not be as helpful for the purposes of our analysis, we went through a procedure outlined
in 49 C.F.R. 1244.9(c)(1) to request the full sample for research use. The procedure is somewhat
similar to a FOIA process that might be familiar to many researchers. The main difference is that
the information request has to be published in the Federal Register, and any interested parties
can comment on the request. In order to limit any competitive concerns or concerns regarding the
impact of our findings on current railroad practices, we requested the data only up to and including
2003. As noted above, our identification robustness check is a merger; however there were no major
mergers since 2003 (for that matter since 1999), thus we did not believe that the more current years
would have been particularly helpful.
The sample includes a multitude of railroads. However, from 2001 to 2003 – the years that we
use in our main analysis – there are four major railroads that comprise of about 80% of the overall
volume. We use only these railroads in our main analysis. We use only the last three years because
previous years had several mergers that could have affected prices in many ways. We discuss these
mergers below and use one of them as a robustness check for our estimates.
The sample is weighted by the STB to ensure national representation. A datapoint is a shipment.
For that shipment we observe railroad(s) providing the service, origination point, termination point,
any junctions where the shipment changed railroads, total price charged, the distance of the route,
the weight of the shipment, the commodity shipped, and well over a hundred other characteristics.
The industry standard for measuring price is RPTM – revenue per ton mile. Upon computing
RPTM we found considerable variation. In order to eliminate any potential confounding effects,
we focus on the most homogeneous commodity that is frequently shipped by rail – coal (STCC
code 1121290). Up until the explosion of intermodal freight (standard-size containers that can be
stacked on ships, rail, or trucks), coal was the commodity contributing the most revenue to freight
railroads. After we focus on coal, the outliers in the RPTM were not as far from the rest of the
distribution as in the whole sample, however, we still observed occasional shipments with RPTM
of more than 100 times the median. We eliminate the top 5% and the bottom 5% of RPTM data
from our sample. Eliminating the top and the bottom 1% does not change our results qualitatively.
The variables in Table 1 are the same variables as we use in our analyses below. The variables
are log of the distance of the route, log of total weight of this shipment, log of weight per loaded
railcar, volume on that route (to account for possible economies of scale/scope), whether the shipper
owns the rail car, HHI at the origin of the shipment, HHI at the destination (both HHIs at the
county level), a binary variable indicating whether the railroad is a monopolist at the origin, same
variable for the destination, the log of the shipment-specific variable cost, and whether the rate
is masked in the public sample.8 Note that the variable indicating whether the rate is masked
(CalcRate) is, effectively, also the variable indicating that there was negotiation over the rate, and
allowing us to control for any potential selection.
8As for almost any cost measurement, there is a debate whether the cost measured is actually a marginal cost,
see Wilson and Wolak (2016) arguing that it is not. We simply use this as a noisy proxy for the actual cost, and do
not take a stand on whether this is the proper cost to use for any regulatory reasons.
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Table 1: Summary statistics.
Mean p25 Median p75
lnRPTM -4.002 -4.676 -4.069 -3.478
Treatment 0.0805 0 0 0
lnMiles 6.143 5.733 6.415 6.980
lnTons 9.156 9.200 9.456 9.569
lnTonsCar 4.702 4.635 4.723 4.777
lnVolTons 14.432 13.485 14.650 15.592
DOwn 0.637 0 1 1
HHIorigin 0.706 0.501 0.505 1
HHIterm 0.905 .927 1 1
DMorigin 0.315 0 0 1
DMterm 0.585 0 1 1
lnCosts 10.734 10.206 11.117 11.572
CalcRate 0.604 0 1 1
3 Main analysis
Our estimation strategy is as follows. Consider a shipper that wants to ship coal from A to C,
a route that passes through B. We estimate whether the price (RPTM) paid from A to C is the
same when the same railroad owns both AB and BC tracks as it is when one railroad owns AB and
another owns BC. We estimate difference in prices by comparing otherwise similar routes, with the
difference being whether the route is wholly-owned.
We use a pricing specification used by previous railroad-specific research to get our estimates.
The specification, effectively a hedonic pricing regression, was used by Christensen Associates (2010)
in a report prepared for the STB – in other words a report by a specialized consulting firm, with
the industry’s regulator as the customer. The report tweaks a previously existing specification from
the academic literature, Mac Donald (1989), with the article looking at an unrelated deregulatory
question. In addition to the exact specification used in the report for the STB, we also include
shipment-specific costs that have a highly significant coefficient.9 We do not use proximity of water
ports that the report used – it is not statistically significant in our estimates and does not change
the estimate of interest regardless of whether it is included.
We also include the treatment variable that we are interested in – whether the shipment is
served by two railroads or by one. None of the shipments that we observe are served by more than
two railroads.
A particular industry practice somewhat complicates our analysis. The railroads are permitted
to rebill shipments that are served by two railroads. In other words, we often observe a shipment
9The cost variable inherently has a significant measurement error, since measuring marginal costs is typically a
hard problem in a specific case, let alone across industry for all shipments. However, given that we are utilizing a
hedonic pricing regression, are not interested in the coefficient on the cost variable in and of itself, and expect that
costs matter for pricing, we felt that we should include this variable. If the measurement error is overwhelming, then
we should get a not statistically significant coefficient. We assume that the measurement error in marginal costs is
not correlated with our coefficient of interest.
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served by one railroad with the flag indicating that it was rebilled: instead of observing route AC,
showing that AB was served by railroad 1 and BC was served by railroad 2, we see AB served
by railroad 1 with a rebilling flag. There are considerably more rebills in the data than there are
routes with junctions. If we were to have the universe of shipments, as opposed to a sample, we
could have connected the missing pieces since BC served by railroad 2 with a rebilling flag would
have also been in our sample. However, this type of a match is not possible given that we only
have a sample. Thus, our treatment variable is 1 if we observe either a junction or a rebill. It is 0
otherwise.10
Thus, our specification is
lnRPTM = βinteresttreatment+
+ β × [lnMiles+ lnTons+ lnTonsCar + lnV olTons+DOwn+HHIorigin +HHIterm
+DMorigin +DMterm + lnCosts+ CalcRate] + FEorigin + FEterm
+ FErailroadorigin + FErailroadterm + FEquarter.
(1)
In addition to the variables described above, we also include fixed effects for origin, termination
point, railroad serving the origin, railroad serving the termination point (different if there is a
junction), and quarter-year (for example, Q1 of 2001). We cluster our standard errors at the level
of origin-termination-quarter-year.
We present the estimation results in Table 2. We estimate seven models in total. First, we
estimate equation (1) on the whole sample without fixed effects. These results are presented in
column (1). Next, we estimate the same model with fixed effects. The results are shown in column
(2). Because our results can be affected by the extreme values of the dependent variable, we
re-estimate models (1) and (2) on the sample that excludes top and bottom 1% of the PRTM
distribution and on the sample that excludes top and bottom 5% of the PRTM distribution. These
results are presented in columns (3)-(6), respectively. Finally, we eliminate top and bottom 5% of
the RPTM distribution and observations with missing rebill variable11 and re-estimate equation
(1). These results are presented in column (7).
The results are very consistent across all models. The effect of treatment is economically
small and statistically insignificant. The coefficients of other covariates are also pretty consistent
across the models, except the weight per loaded railcar, HHI at origin and termination point, and
indicators of monopoly at origin and termination points.
While the estimates of the treatment effect are consistent across the models, one might worry
that the results might be affected by trimming the sample and excluding treated observations
with high revenue per ton mile. Therefore, we present the number of excluded observations by
10This measurement issue was also noted by McCullough and Thompson (2013).
11The rebill variable is poorly recorded in years 2001 and 2002 with 40% of observations missing. Starting 2003
the reporting of this variable has significantly improved and there are no missing values of rebill in 2003. While,
there are many observations missing in the earlier years, it seems that most of them migrated in ’no rebill’ category
in 2003 – the percentage of observations in ’no rebill’ category increased from 60% to 85%. While the percentage of
observations in ’rebill’ category increased from 0.4 percent to 15 %.
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treatment group in Table 3. The number of treated observations in top 1% and top 5% of the
RPTM distribution is very small – 2 and 21 observations, respectively.
Table 2: Effect of either a junction or a rebill on price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lnRPTM lnRPTM lnRPTM lnRPTM lnRPTM lnRPTM lnRPTM RPTM
Whole Whole Trim at 1 % Trim at 1 % Trim at 5% Trim at 5% Trim at 5% Trim at 5%
exclude exclude
missing rebill missing rebill
Treatment -0.007 -0.013 0.001 -0.014 0.004 -0.006 -0.002 0.0002
(0.023) (0.008) (0.023) (0.008) (0.024) (0.008) (0.009) (0.0002)
lnMiles -0.766∗∗∗ -0.919∗∗∗ -0.775∗∗∗ -0.829∗∗∗ -0.833∗∗∗ -0.779∗∗∗ -0.726∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.028) (0.022) (0.023) (0.001)
lnTons -0.344∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.460∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗
(0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.018) (0.030) (0.016) (0.017) (0.0002)
lnTonscar -0.432∗∗∗ -0.303∗∗∗ -0.290∗∗∗ -0.063 -0.221∗∗ -0.041 -0.126∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.089) (0.077) (0.045) (0.082) (0.039) (0.054) (0.001)
lnVoltons -0.072∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
DOwn -0.081∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.0001)
HHIorigin 0.354
∗∗∗ -0.179∗ 0.373∗∗∗ -0.132 0.387∗∗∗ -0.102 -0.194∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.075) (0.042) (0.070) (0.042) (0.060) (0.064) (0.003)
HHIterm 0.063 0.042 0.036 0.049 0.076
∗ 0.092 0.107 0.002
(0.034) (0.069) (0.032) (0.069) (0.030) (0.066) (0.071) (0.001)
DMorigin -0.047
∗ 0.005 -0.061∗∗ 0.003 -0.057∗∗ 0.007 0.022∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.006) (0.019) (0.006) (0.019) (0.006) (0.006) (0.0002)
DMterm 0.099
∗∗∗ -0.004 0.102∗∗∗ -0.001 0.077∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.003 0.00002
(0.014) (0.007) (0.013) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.0001)
lnCosts 0.370∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.030) (0.033) (0.021) (0.035) (0.019) (0.020)
Costs -0.000∗∗
(0.000)
CalcRate -0.024∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000)
Fixed Effects – – –
N 78,629 78,569 77,057 77,007 70,769 70,728 52,447 52,447
Adj. R2 0.86 0.96 0.86 0.97 0.83 0.96 0.97 0.96
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
All models with fixed effects include fixed effects for country of origin, destination county, railroad serving
the origin, railroad serving the termination point, and quarter-year.
Standard errors are clustered by country of origin, destination county, and quarter-year.
As in any hedonic regression, the coefficients should not be interpreted as causal. In particular,
the coefficients on HHI are not causal – HHI is endogenous, and we do not use a valid instrument
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Table 3: PRTM Extreme Values by Treatment Group
Top 1% Bottom 1% Top 5% Bottom 5%
Controls 784 564 3,910 3,2345
Treated 2 222 21 686
All 786 786 3,931 3,931
to address this endogeneity problem. Nonetheless, the coefficients on our control variables are
generally of the expected sign, statistically significant, and broadly similar to those obtained by
both Mac Donald (1989) and Christensen Associates (2010). In particular, the economies associated
with longer hauls (Miles), larger shipments (Tons), larger loads per car (Tonscar), and higher annual
volumes on the route (Voltons) are all reflected in negative and statistically significant coefficients
in almost all specifications. In terms of magnitudes, our estimated coefficients are closer to those
of the previous studies for Miles and Voltons, not as close for Tons and Tonscar; however, as
Christensen Associates (2010) point out, these latter two variables are not independent of each
other, so that their separated coefficients must be interpreted with greater caution.
Like Christensen Associates (2010) but unlike Mac Donald (1989), we observe unstable and
often counterintuitive signs on the coefficients for competition at origin (especially) and destination
points. Christensen Associates conjecture that a positive coefficient on the number of railroads
serving the origin may reflect competition in aspects of service quality that are unobservable in the
waybill data.
4 Methodological robustness checks
4.1 Propensity score blocking
We follow Imbens and Rubin (2015) and estimate causal effect based on subclassification (blocking)
on the estimated propensity score. First, we estimate the propensity score, or probability of being
treated, as a function of the variables available in the Waybill sample. Next, we partition the
sample into blocks based on the values of the estimated propensity score, so that within a block,
the estimated propensity scores are approximately the same. Then, within each block, we estimate
causal effect using the fixed effects regression outlined earlier. Finally, the average treatment effect
for the whole sample is calculated as an average of the within-block estimated treatment effects
weighted by block sizes.
Imbens and Rubin (2015) show that within blocks with the same estimated propensity score,
the super-population distribution of covariates is identical in the treated and control groups. This
property of the propensity score implies that splitting sample into blocks with approximately con-
stant propensity score eliminates systematic biases associated with differences in observed covariates
between treated and control groups, and thus leads to more precise estimates. However, blocking
alone typically does not eliminate all biases that arise because of the differences in the covariates
between control and treatment groups, because often even when data are split into smaller groups
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the estimated propensity score is not constant within blocks. Therefore, we run a regression to
estimate the effect within each block to further reduce bias of estimates.
The key in the blocking approach is to construct comparable control and treatment groups
within each block. Therefore, the first step is to refine the sample and eliminate outliers in the
same way as in the previous section – we eliminate observations in the 5 bottom and 5 top percent
of the RPTM distribution. Additionally, we identify counties with all originating/terminating
shipments in either control or treatment group and eliminate shipments that originate/terminate
in such counties. Ideally, we would use county dummies in our propensity score regression; however,
there are over a thousand of such dummies, and doing this is not practical. Eliminating counties
that perfectly predict treatment is effectively doing what a logit propensity score would do if we
could run the estimation with all the county dummies.
Finally, we eliminate all shipments for which rebilling flag variable is missing. Initial sample
includes 72,300 control group observations and 6,331 treatment group observations. We discard
61,588 observations in total, the vast majority of which is due to the perfect predictor counties
mentioned above. The final sample includes 16,043 observations, among them 12,860 observations
are in the control group (18% of the original control group) and 3,183 are in the treatment group
(66% of the original treatment group).12
Next, we estimate the propensity score using the following logit specification:
Treatment = γ × [lnMiles+ lnTons+ lnTonsCar + lnV olTons+DOwn+HHIorigin +HHIterm
+DMorigin +DMterm + lnCosts+ CalcRate+ Share treatedorigin + Share treatedterm]
+ FErailroadorigin + FErailroadterm + FEquarter.
(2)
The control variables are as in equation (1); additionally, Share treatedorigin is a share of shipments
served by more than one railroad originating in a county of shipment origin, and Share treatedterm
is a share of shipments served by more than one railroad terminating in a county of shipment
final destination (this variable serves as another proxy for having county-level dummies in the
specification). The results of this estimation are shown in Table A2.
Next, we discard observations with the estimated propensity score too close to zero or one
to eliminate units from either control or treatment group that do not a have good counterpart
in treatment or control group, respectively. Specifically, we drop observations with propensity
scores above 0.9375 and below 0.0269. The top threshold cuts off the top 0.25% of the untreated
observations and about 24% of the treated. The bottom threshold cuts off about 4% of the treated
observations and about 60% of the untreated. Clearly, the data above the top threshold is highly
skewed towards being treated and the data below the bottom threshold is highly skewed towards
12As Imbens and Rubin (2015) argue, this approach sacrifices some external validity – the final estimates of the
average treatment effect for the trimmed sample are less likely to be valid for the original sample. However, the
advantage of this approach is the internal validity, i.e., the estimates of the treatment effect for the trimmed sample
are more accurate than the estimates of the average treatment effect in the original sample.
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being untreated. Table 4 displays the subsample sizes by treatment group and propensity score
value.
Table 4: Sample Sizes for Trimming Based on Estimated Propensity Score
eˆ(Xi) < 0.0269 0.0269 < eˆ(Xi) < 0.9375 eˆ(Xi) > 0.9375
Controls 7,716 5,112 32
Treated 164 3,027 992
All 7,880 8,139 1,024
Next, we split the sample into twenty blocks. Table A1 shows the details for these twenty blocks
including the cut off values for the propensity score, the number of units by treatment status in
each group, and the standardized differences in control variables and propensity scores for the whole
trimmed sample and within each block.13 The idea is to keep splitting the blocks until either the
covariates look balanced or until there aren’t enough treated or untreated observations relative to
the number of controls in the regression that we run inside each block. Our regression specification
has over a dozen of observables and even more fixed effects, thus we do not split blocks further if we
have 30 or fewer treated or 30 or fewer untreated observations. Each individual block is much more
balanced comparing to the whole sample – the normalized differences between covariates are much
smaller within the blocks than in the whole sample. Finally, we estimate treatment effect within
each block using model specified in equation (1). As we show in Table A1 in the Appendix, there
is sufficient difference in the covariate distributions within the blocks and thus regression helps to
further adjust for these differences.
We present results for the parameter estimates from the regressions for the twenty blocks in
Table 5. The overall average treatment effect (ATE) is calculated in the following way:
ATE =
∑
j
qj × τˆ(j), (3)
where j = 1, ..., 20 corresponds to the block number; q(j) = N(j)/N , where N(j) is the number of
observations in block j and N is the total number of observations in the sample; finally, τˆ(j) is the
within-block least squares estimate of the treatment effect for block j.
The variance of the overall ATE is calculated in the similar manner:
V (ATE) =
∑
j
q2j × Vˆ (τˆ(j)), (4)
where Vˆ (τˆ(j)) is the estimated variance of the treatment effect within block j.
The results indicate that the ATE equals -0.05 with the standard deviation of 0.02, which
13The standardized difference between two samples for a variable is calculated using the following formula, e.g., for
lnMiles:
z =
lnMilestreated − lnMilescontrol√
s2treated/Ntreated + s
2
control/Ncontrol
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confirms our main results that shipments served by several railroads are not higher priced than
shipments served by one railroad. The magnitude of the coefficient is small in the absolute value,
and is close to the coefficient that we obtain in the main specification.
Table 5: Independent Least Squares Regressions within Blocks
Block N Est. S.E.
1 2,069 0.06 0.04
2 1,201 0.00 0.01
3 358 -0.09 0.03
4 151 0.05 0.04
5 455 0.01 0.02
6 90 0.01 0.01
7 255 0.00 0.02
8 251 -0.23 0.03
9 58 -0.14 0.07
10 118 0.00 0.00
11 78 0.40 0.05
12 78 0.10 0.08
13 97 -0.02 0.11
14 147 -0.30 0.06
15 120 -0.09 0.08
16 50 0.11 0.04
17 167 0.08 0.07
18 1,088 -0.06 0.06
19 838 -0.40 0.10
20 314 -0.01 0.02
ATE -0.05* 0.02
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
4.2 Double Machine Learning
We refer readers who are not familiar with the standard machine learning techniques, such as
neural nets, to the Appendix. Even though ML estimators cannot be used for causal inference
directly, the estimation techniques that combine regression and machine learning methods are able
to provide valid estimates of causal effects. Specifically, we implement double machine learning
(DML) estimator developed by Chernozhukov et al. (2016). In combination with cross-fitting, the
estimator is efficient and approximately unbiased and normal. The estimation proceeds as follows.
First, we model the outcome variable as the following partially linear model:
Y = Dθ0 + g0(Z) + U, (5)
D = m0(Z) + V, (6)
where E[U |Z,D] = 0 and E[V |Z] = 0. Y is the outcome variable, D is the treatment variable, Z
is a vector of covariates listed in equation (2), and U and V are disturbances. The first equation
is the main equation that we would like to estimate with the parameter of interest θ0. The second
equation keeps track of confounding, or dependence of treatment variable on covariates. A set of
control variables Z impacts outcome variable and treatment variable via the functions g0(Z) and
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m0(Z) respectively.
DML estimator is obtained by partialing out the effect of Z from both Y and D and estimating
the regression model implied by equations (5) - (6):
W = V θ0 + U, (7)
where V = D−m0(Z) and W = Y − l0(Z), where l0(Z) = E[Y |Z] = m0(Z)θ0+g0(Z). We estimate
functions m0 and l0 using neural nets. We chose neural nets because this is one of the machine
learning techniques that is most often used by machine learning researchers due to out-of-sample
predictive success. In addition, when choosing which machine learning method to use, we were
driven by our desire to deal flexibly with any potential nonlinearities and interactions. We believe
that neural nets accomplish this objective better than, for example, post-lasso.
First, we split the data into two equal subsamples – the training sample and the test sample.
Next, we obtain parameter estimates using neural nets and the training sample and construct
estimates of lˆ0 and mˆ0 using obtained parameters and the test sample. Finally, we use these
estimates to form Wˆ = Y − lˆ0(Z) and Vˆ = D − mˆ0(Z) and then obtain “double” ML estimator:
θˆ0 =
( 1
n
n∑
i=1
Vˆ 2i
)−1 1
n
n∑
i=1
VˆiWˆi. (8)
Chernozhukov et al. (2016) prove that this estimator is root-n consistent and approximately
Gaussian under a very mild set of conditions. As Chernozhukov et al. (2017) note, the specific
sample partitioning has no impact on estimation results asymptotically but may be important in
finite samples. In other words, when estimating using a finite sample, the value of the estimator
depends on a specific split of the sample. Hence, to get asymptotically valid estimates, we repeat
estimation procedure S times each time partitioning sample in halves. We then report estimates
that incorporate information from the distribution of the estimates obtained from the different data
partitions. As a result, we report mean estimate based on S obtained estimates of the parameter
of interest:
θˆMean0 =
1
S
S∑
s=1
θˆs0, (9)
where θˆs0 is a point estimate obtained in each of S estimations. Finally, we calculate the standard
error of the θˆmean0 that incorporates additional variation due to different data splits:
σˆMean =
√√√√ 1
S
S∑
s=1
(
σˆ2s + (θˆ
s
0 − θˆMean0 )2
)
, (10)
where σˆs = (EV
2)−1EU2V 2(EV 2)−1.
We present the results in Table 6. We trim the top and the bottom 5% of the RPTM distribution
as before. We implement neural net estimator using a 2-fold cross-fitting (splitting sample in halves)
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with 10 hidden layers and a decay parameter of 0.01, which prevents over-fitting.14 We repeat
the main procedure 100 times repartitioning data in each replication. The result is again very
similar to the result in the the main specification. While the results show a statistically significant
negative coefficient, the coefficient is small in absolute terms, thus we do not attempt to explain
the unexpected sign.
Table 6: Effect of either a junction or a rebill on price, double machine learning.
ATE -0.06***
(0.016)
N 70,728
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
5 Identification robustness check: BNSF merger
On December 31st, 1996 two major railroads merged, ATSF and BN, creating the largest railroad in
the U.S. – BNSF. Although the ATSF and BN were primarily parallel rather than interconnecting
railroads – for years they joined the Southern Pacific and Union Pacific as the four major railroads
serving the western US – there were some routes on which they connected to provide end-to-end
service. Cournot analysis, or the presence of double marginalization, would suggest that if any
route went from being served as a connecting route by ATSF and BN to being served by a single
company BNSF, the price on that route should decrease. However, so would economies of scale
or scope coming from the merger. Following previous academic work suggesting that it takes a
couple of years for any economies of scale or scope to materialize, we use years 1995 – 1999 to
test the hypothesis of whether price decreased on previously separately-owned routes following the
merger.15
It turns out that only three coal routes were affected in this way (served by ATSF and BN as
connecting carriers before the merger), all originating in Wyoming. As a part of getting the merger
approved by the STB, BNSF agreed to give trackage rights to another railroad (UP) for one of the
routes. That could, of course, lead to an immediate price drop due to competition on this route
that is now served by both the combined ATSF and, through trackage rights, the UP; thus, we do
not use this route. Therefore, we have two routes left.
We use a difference-in-differences specification mirroring our setup in the main analysis. Thus,
instead of the treatment variable in the main analysis, we have a variable for affected routes,
another variable for post-merger, and finally yet another variable for the interaction (difference-
14We tried different number of hidden layers, from 1 to 12, and the results are very similar to the results we get
with 10 hidden layers. Adding hidden layers marginally improves mean standard error that measures model fit to
the data and significantly increases time of the calculation. The estimate of average treatment effect practically stays
the same.
15See Ivaldi and Mccullough (2010). See also Berndt, Friedlaender, Chiang, and Vellturo (1993).
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in-differences) term. The coefficient of interest is the interaction term. Thus, our specification
is
lnRPTM = βinterestPost×AffectedRoutes+ βpostPost+ βaffectedAffectedRoutes
+ β × [lnMiles+ lnTons+ lnTonsCar + lnV olTons+DOwn+HHIorigin +HHIterm
+DMorigin +DMterm + lnCosts+ CalcRate] + FEorigin + FEterm + FErailroadorigin
+ FErailroadterm + FEquarter.
(11)
The variable names and clustering are the same as in the main analysis. In particular, we use
the same controls and the same fixed effects.16
We are also not sure when exactly the price change would have occurred post-merger if it
indeed occurred. In other words, it might have taken some time for BNSF to synchronize the
pricing systems. Thus, we run specification with the first quarter, first two quarters, and first year
post-merger thrown out. Our coefficient of interest does not change significantly. The results are
in Table 7 and, while noisy, are consistent with the results that we presented earlier.
As with any difference-in-differences analysis, a parallel trend graph helps with convincing our-
selves that we have the correct identification strategy. We present the graph below, with the
graph not corrected for any controls. We demean the RPTM for affected routes to preserve pricing
anonymity. The price drop in the affected routes after month ‘460’ is consistent with the previ-
ous empirical literature that suggested that it takes close to two years for economies of scale to
materialize for railroad mergers.
6 Conclusion
We found that, in the U.S. freight rail, prices for shipping coal are not consistent with a Cournot-like
complementary monopoly outcome. Instead, we find evidence consistent with an equilibrium, where
complementary monopolists on routes AB and BC do not charge more than a single monopolist
would charge if she were to own the whole route AC.
How are the railroad companies able to accomplish this? In discussions with industry experts, we
have learned that coal shipment contracts that involve two interconnecting railroads often include
discussions and negotiations between the railroads concerning both the joint rate and the divisions
of the rate, and that these discussions may be motivated/incentivized by coal customers, such as
power plants soliciting joint rate bids for coal supplies. In such circumstances it seems not at all
surprising that the two railroads seeking to win a joint bid can avoid the double marginalization
characteristic of independent price setting of complements.17
16Note that the term βpostPost is unnecessary given the quarter-year fixed effects. We still have it in the regression
simply to make the point that we are using the standard difference-in-differences setup. The downside is the large
magnitude and no statistical significance on coefficient βpost.
17This anecdotal evidence suggests that the negotiation between monopolists and producers, along the lines of
16
Table 7: Effect of merger on price of affected routes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnRPTM lnRPTM lnRPTM lnRPTM
(without 1997Q1) (without 1997Q1 & Q2) (without 1997)
Post × 0.00355 0.0125 0.0214 0.00978
Affected Routes (0.0359) (0.0397) (0.0399) (0.0426)
Post -7605.9 -1972.3 1409.2 -242.3
(5118458.0) (2691777.1) (3536224.9) (2711872.8)
Affected Routes -0.239∗ -0.257∗ -0.568∗∗∗ -0.595∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.118) (0.0664) (0.0695)
lnMiles -0.570∗∗∗ -0.571∗∗∗ -0.576∗∗∗ -0.586∗∗∗
(0.0129) (0.0131) (0.0134) (0.0142)
lnTons 0.00953 0.00862 0.00542 -0.00684
(0.00978) (0.0100) (0.0104) (0.0108)
lnTonsCar -0.169∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗
(0.0194) (0.0199) (0.0205) (0.0222)
lnVolTons -0.0203∗∗∗ -0.0197∗∗∗ -0.0191∗∗∗ -0.0189∗∗∗
(0.00204) (0.00209) (0.00210) (0.00217)
DOwn -0.0856∗∗∗ -0.0858∗∗∗ -0.0851∗∗∗ -0.0807∗∗∗
(0.00419) (0.00429) (0.00441) (0.00460)
HHIorigin 0.0348 0.0334 0.0314 0.0265
(0.0213) (0.0224) (0.0228) (0.0246)
HHIterm -0.0461
∗ -0.0487∗ -0.0567∗ -0.0456
(0.0191) (0.0206) (0.0221) (0.0267)
DMorigin 0.00524 0.00339 0.00107 -0.00943
(0.00555) (0.00565) (0.00563) (0.00544)
DMterm 0.000639 0.00140 0.00326 0.00430
(0.00504) (0.00520) (0.00534) (0.00596)
lnCosts -0.0444∗∗∗ -0.0429∗∗∗ -0.0389∗∗ -0.0233
(0.0119) (0.0122) (0.0125) (0.0131)
CalcRate -0.183∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗
(0.00566) (0.00577) (0.00584) (0.00595)
N 191,565 183,418 174,784 157,296
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 1: Pricing trends for affected and unaffected routes, with the merger occurring on December
31st, 1996.
Our results are directly applicable to the U.S. freight railroad market: for example, we show that
an end-to-end railroad merger would not be needed to fix a Cournot or double-marginalization-like
pricing issue in this market. However, one should be cautious when extrapolating from our results
to other settings.
In particular, while railroads and products requiring multiple patents share the potential for
a Cournot-like outcome, there are many important differences. First, products like cell phones
oftentimes require hundreds of patents, instead of any coal company being able to ship using only
two railroads in our setting. It is possible that a much higher number of complementary monopolists
results in a Cournot-like outcome. Second, in the intellectual property realm, at least some of the
often-discussed issues are around unscrupulous entities that use ‘deceptive sales claims and phony
legal threats’ in order to attempt to collect royalties on invalid patents, effectively threatening a
strike suit.18 This is, of course, not possible for railroads to do. Third, while another concern in the
intellectual property realm is that occasionally manufacturers do not even realize that their product
impinges on patents, coal companies know for sure that they will have to use railroads to transport
coal before they open a coal mine. On the other hand, fourth, while many manufacturers are also
patent holders, so that oftentimes patents might be used defensively, freight railroads typically do
not mine coal themselves.
We hope that our study inspires further work in this area, and in particular more direct analyses
of whether the Cournot hypothesis holds in particular markets. Ideally, economists, legal scholars,
and other interested researchers will analyze similar data from the industries and countries where
Spulber (2017), might be a better fit for this market than direct contact between monopolists as in Schumpeter
(1928).
18See, for example, the FTC’s MPHJ settlement, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/11/ftc-
settlement-bars-patent-assertion-entity-using-deceptive.
18
such data is available. Then, upon having multiple such studies, we could make educated hypotheses
about more industries and, in particular, the degree to which, if any, the four differences above
change our conclusions.
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A Fitting of Neural Networks
Background on machine learning
Readers familiar with the standard machine learning techniques and intuition can safely skip
this section.
Supervised machine learning is used to build a prediction model that relates a set of inputs X
and an outcome variable Y . Machine learning (ML) in this case is called supervised because the
outcome variable guides the learning process. ML models are designed to optimize prediction, and
therefore are concerned with overfitting and are not explicitly concerned with unbiased estimates.
Consequently, ML is tailored for applications when there are many attributes of a unit relative
to the number of observations and when one wants to allow flexible functional form between the
inputs and an output, e.g., when non-linearity might be hard to capture using conventional reduced
form models.
While ML techniques excel at prediction, they are not necessarily great for causal inference. The
focus of ML methods, prediction and improved prediction, is sometimes achieved by using biased
estimates (for example, by placing zero coefficients on some covariates to simplify the model). The
intuition is explained in Kleinberg et al. (2015) and has to do with variance-bias tradeoff. Suppose
a training dataset T of n data points (xi, yi) is used to pick a function f to predict y using x. Now,
consider a mean squared error at a new point x0, MSE(x0):
MSE(x0) = ET [f(x0)− yˆ0]2
= ET [yˆ0 − ET (yˆ0)]2 + [ET (yˆ0)− f(x0)]2
= V arT (yˆ0) +Bias
2(yˆ0)
(12)
This bias-variance decomposition of the MSE shows that there is a tradeoff between variance and
bias of the estimate. More generally, as the model complexity increases, the variance tends to
increase and the squared bias tends to decrease.19
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate is unbiased under some assumptions. However, unbi-
asedness comes at the cost of higher variance. Gauss-Markov theorem states that the least squares
estimate has the smallest variance among all unbiased linear estimates, but there exist biased esti-
mates with smaller variance. For example, setting to zero some of the least squares estimates might
result in a small bias and a significant reduction in variance and thus a better prediction. ML meth-
ods optimize this balance between bias and variance and therefore while potentially outperforming
OLS in prediction, ML estimates are likely biased.
ML methods select a subset of predictors to produce a model that is interpretable and has
possibly lower prediction error than the full model. In particular, ML techniques minimize:
fˆML = argmin
f
n∑
i=1
(yi − f(xi))2 + λR(f), (13)
19See Hastie et al. (2009) pp. 9-42 for more detail.
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where R(f) is a regularizer that penalizes model complexity. λ ≥ 0 is a complexity parameter that
controls the amount of shrinkage (i.e., how many coefficients are shrunk toward zero). The larger
the λ is, the more parsimonious is the model. Regularizer function may take various forms, for
example, for linear models R(fβ) = ‖β‖d, where d = 1 corresponds to the lasso estimator and d = 2
corresponds to the ridge and neural networks estimators (in neural networks λ is known as weight
decay).20
Another important technique used in ML to ensure the quality of prediction is cross-validation.
The data sample is split into training and test sample. First, the model is fitted using the training
sample. Then the performance of the obtained model is tested on the test sample. This procedure
allows to avoid overfitting and derives the optimal level of model complexity.
The ML method that we use in this estimation is neural net. Neural nets have been previously
used in economics and finance literature (e.g., White (1988), Swanson and White (1997), Qi (1999)).
Neural nets consist of a number of simple neuron-like processing units, organized in layers. Every
unit in a layer connected to all the units in a previous layer. These connections are not equal: each
connection may have a different strength or weight. Data enters at the inputs and passes through
the network, layer by layer, until it arrives at the output. Layers between the inputs and an output
are called hidden layers as they are not directly observed (latent). In the network that we use for
our analysis there is no feedback between layers, and thus it is called feed-forward network. Figure
1 shows a network with several inputs, one output, and one hidden layer.
Neural nets can be seen as a two-stage non-linear regression. The hidden units Zm are created
from linear combinations of the inputs, and output variable Yk is modeled as a function of linear
combinations of Zm:
Zm = σ(α0m + α
′
mX), m = 1, ...,M,
f(X) = β0 + β
′Z,
(14)
The activation function σ(v) = 1
1+e−v is known as sigmoid. The unknown parameters in neural
network are called weights: θ = {{α0m, αm : m = 1, 2, ...,M}, {β0, β}}. Weights are found from the
training data by fitting the model.
We use the sum-of-squared errors as a measure of fit:
R(θ) =
N∑
i=1
(yi − f(xi))2 + λJ(θ), (15)
where J(θ) is a weight decay and
J(θ) =
∑
m
β2m +
∑
ml
α2ml (16)
The decay parameter penalizes large weights in the neural network and prevents overfitting.
The generic approach is to minimize R(θ) + λJ(θ) by gradient descent described directly below.
20‖β‖1 =∑ki=1 |βk|, ‖β‖2 =∑kj=1 β2k, where k is the number of controls in a subset chosen by the ML algorithm.
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Figure 2: Neural Net with One Hidden Layer
Gradient descent algorithm
To find the set of weights θ that yield the best prediction in the neural network we minimize
the sum of sum-of-squared errors R(θ) and weight decay J(θ)21
R(θ) + λJ(θ) =
N∑
i=1
(yi − f(xi))2 + λJ(θ) =
N∑
i=1
(yi − f(xi))2 + λ(
M∑
m=1
β2m +
M∑
m=1
N∑
l=1
α2ml).
(17)
Conventionally this function is minimized by gradient descent. Given a function defined by a set
of parameters, gradient descent starts with an initial set of parameter values and iteratively moves
toward a set of parameters that minimize the function. This iterative minimization is achieved by
taking steps in the negative direction of the function gradient. In this case, the gradient is easily
derived using the chain rule:
∂Ri
∂βm
= −2(yi − f(xi))zmi + 2λβm,
∂Ri
∂αml
= −2(yi − f(xi))βmσ′(αmixi)xil + 2λαml.
(18)
Given these derivatives, the gradient descent update at the (r + 1)st iteration has the form
21This algorithm is thoroughly described in Hastie et al. (2009), pp. 395-396.
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β(r+1)m = β
(r)
m − γr
N∑
i=1
∂Ri
∂β
(r)
m
,
α
(r+1)
ml = α
(r)
ml − γr
N∑
i=1
∂Ri
∂α
(r)
ml
,
(19)
where γ is called a learning rate.
Now, equation (18) can be rewritten as
∂Ri
∂βm
= δizmi,
∂Ri
∂αml
= smixil,
(20)
The quantities δi and smi are called “errors” from the current model at the output and hidden
layers, respectively. From equations (18) and (20)
smi = σ
′(αTmxi)βmδi, (21)
which is known as a back-propagation equations. Then the gradient in (19) is updated using a two-
pass algorithm. First, in the forward pass, the current weights are fixed and the predicted values
fˆ(xi) are computed using equation (14). Next in the backward pass, the errors δi are computed,
and then back-propagated via (21) to obtain the errors smi. Finally, δi and smi are used to update
the gradient in (19).
There are certain guidelines that are recommended to successfully use neural networks. First,
the starting values are chosen to be random values near zero. Second, it is recommended to use
weight decay to avoid overfitting. It might be useful to scale inputs to have zero mean and standard
deviation one – it ensures that inputs are treated equally in the regularization process and gives
a higher quality prediction. Finally, it is better to have many hidden layers than too few to allow
for model flexibility. Usually the number of hidden layers varies from 5 to 100. Hastie, Tibshirani,
and Friedman (2009) provide a discussion of these guidelines. Finally, we use the R package nnet
to train our neural network.
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B Additional Tables
Table A1: Normalized Differences in the Covariates after Subclassification for Trimmed Sample
Block
Whole 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Sample
lnMiles 11.06 3.17 1.83 3.21 3.32 0.07 -1.71 -5.35 2.88 2.40 3.64
lnTons 8.21 -3.37 -3.93 -1.87 -0.62 -1.79 0.33 -1.16 -3.82 0.51 -1.24
lnVolTons 14.25 -10.80 -6.07 -4.55 0.76 -2.87 -2.54 -2.40 -4.72 0.18 -0.92
Down 9.04 -5.69 1.87 -2.35 1.29 -3.41 0.93 2.23 -0.29 0.42 -2.00
lnCosts 10.81 2.77 -0.12 2.16 2.43 -0.45 -1.29 -5.60 0.94 1.72 2.80
lnTonsCar 10.40 -0.82 -1.21 -1.20 -1.27 -3.25 -0.38 4.04 -2.23 -1.95 -0.20
HHIorigin -7.20 9.32 4.90 1.79 -1.47 0.98 2.47 2.83 0.44 -0.04 2.96
HHIterm -9.70 2.39 -2.28 0.42 1.79 -6.31 2.75 2.65 -1.72 0.23 4.39
DMorigin -2.61 11.37 4.18 1.97 -1.16 2.10 3.48 2.92 -1.16 0.30 1.25
DMterm -6.71 1.92 -2.01 -4.66 -2.69 -0.68 3.50 1.72 -1.19 1.13 2.84
CalcRate -3.67 2.07 3.11 3.72 4.10 -0.24 1.51 1.83 -1.14 0.21 -0.59
P-Score 100.79 0.18 4.39 1.22 -0.04 -4.24 2.16 -3.36 4.16 1.52 -1.58
Min P-Score 0.027 0.027 0.069 0.129 0.152 0.164 0.232 0.262 0.365 0.419 0.455
Max P-Score 0.938 0.069 0.129 0.152 0.164 0.232 0.262 0.365 0.419 0.455 0.510
# Controls 12,860 2,026 1,174 324 128 436 71 216 210 34 96
# Treated 4,183 45 43 42 31 31 31 47 47 32 31
Block
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
lnMiles 6.90 0.33 2.86 5.95 -0.71 -0.83 -3.92 0.09 -0.68 -0.21
lnTons -0.49 0.91 1.59 2.26 2.86 1.36 3.15 2.83 2.94 9.17
lnVolTons 1.06 0.61 2.45 4.25 1.70 0.16 1.30 3.45 3.27 1.32
Down -2.08 -0.77 -1.72 -2.62 1.27 2.57 6.42 3.16 2.11 0.50
lnCosts 4.48 0.25 2.41 6.54 -0.03 -0.06 -2.61 0.35 -0.22 1.41
lnTonsCar -1.15 1.46 1.35 1.68 4.30 1.72 0.28 2.05 1.94 0.13
DMorigin 0.27 1.75 0.20 -1.63 -1.75 -1.00 -3.96 -2.77 -3.23 -1.17
HHIterm -2.04 -0.28 3.78 5.35 6.31 2.03 1.59 -0.88 0.16 4.71
DMorigin -2.65 0.85 0.36 -1.62 -1.74 -0.70 -3.02 -2.46 -3.23 -1.22
DMterm -2.46 -0.06 3.90 4.10 6.21 2.00 0.74 -1.03 -0.45 0.16
CalcRate -2.94 -0.79 -2.03 -1.47 1.42 1.57 2.85 0.60 0.33 -0.72
P-Score 1.02 1.16 0.17 -0.22 -1.51 1.13 0.89 1.04 0.44 -2.15
Min P-Score 0.510 0.547 0.565 0.592 0.612 0.641 0.672 0.758 0.865 0.922
Max P-Score 0.547 0.565 0.592 0.612 0.641 0.672 0.758 0.865 0.922 0.938
# Controls 54 52 42 27 31 31 47 52 30 31
# Treated 30 33 63 126 95 30 126 1,044 813 287
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Table A2: Propensity score estimation.
(1)
Treatment
lnMiles -2.594∗∗∗ DMorigin 1.297∗∗∗
(0.319) (0.166)
lnTons -3.061∗∗∗ DMterm -0.230∗
(0.334) (0.094)
lnTonscar 3.448∗∗∗ lnCosts 3.649∗∗∗
(0.640) (0.421)
lnVolTons -0.0646 CalcRate -0.00227
(0.038) (0.083)
DOwn 0.616∗∗∗ Share treatedorigin 14.18∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.598)
HHIorigin -3.346
∗∗∗ Share treatedterm 12.48∗∗∗
(0.350) (0.291)
HHIterm -0.790
∗∗∗ Const -16.75∗∗∗
(0.234) (2.731)
N 17,043
Pseudo R2 0.64
Standard errors in parentheses. The model also includes originating railroad
fixed effects, terminating railroad fixed effects, and quarter fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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